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Evidence of the Absence of Fresh Complaint Is
Admissible in Sodomy ProsecutionUnited States v. Goodman*
Defendant was convicted of two counts of sodomy by a general
court martial.1 The alleged victims of the defendant had failed to
complain immediately following the incidents, and evidence of
such failure on the part of one of the witnesses had been admitted
at trial. A Navy board of review affirmed the conviction, modifying
the sentence.2 Defendant appealed to the United States Court of
Military Appeals on the ground that it had been prejudicial error
for the law officer to refuse to give a proffered instruction to the
court-martial panel respecting the victim's failure to make fresh
complaints. On appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. 3 Evidence of the absence of fresh complaint is admissible in a sodomy
proceeding, and it is prejudicial error to refuse to give instructions
concerning such absenc·e.
Although the issue in the principal case was whether instructions should have been given concerning the effect of the absence
of fresh complaint,4 it is necessary first to consider the admissibility
of such evidence because the law developed in this area. The rules
governing admissibility of evidence establishing fresh complaint
were developed by the courts in rape cases. Until the nineteenth
century, evidence of fresh complaint in prosecutions for rape was
admitted by the courts with little or no attempt to explain the
principles which supported admission. 5 In the early nineteenth
century, however, courts began to search for principles to justify
the admission of these statements and particularly to reconcile th~ir
admission with the hearsay rule, 6 which in general denies admission
of consistent out-of-court statements to corroborate a witness' testimony.7 Three theories of admissibility were developed. The first
• 13 U.S.C.M.A. 663 (1963).
I. Defendant was convicted for performing acts of fellatio upon the victims under
Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1958).
2. The sentence of dishonorable discharge was reduced to a bad conduct discharge.
Principal case at 664.
3. Chief Judge Quinn dissented on the ground that the matter of the absence of
fresh complaint should be left solely to counsel's arguments and should not be isolated
by the law officer for the court's consideration. Principal case at 670.
4. The court's dictum respecting admissibility of fresh complaint appears to have
been based on the UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR CoURT MARTIAL 1J 142c (1951), providing
for the admission of evidence establishing a fresh complaint in prosecutions for sexual
offenses. See principal case at 666.
5. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1134 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Ibid.
7. See, e.g., Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W.2d 731 (1942); Grand Forks Bldg. &:
Dev. Co. v. Implement Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W.2d 495 (1948).
If the complaint itself is not admitted, evidence of a fresh complaint is not, of course,
hearsay at all; the problem is merely one of materiality and relevancy,
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theory requires the complaint or statement to be a so-called res
gestae declaration, 8 an exception to the hearsay rule which permits
the introduction of certain declarations made spontaneously with
the act in question. However, the strict requirement that the complaint have been immediately after the act and while the victim
was still under the excitement of the outrage9 has prevented frequent use of this theory. 10 The second theory permits the admission
of evidence of fresh complaint for the corroboration or substantiation of the prosecutrix after she has testified and has been impeached.11 The courts differ, however, as to what type of an impeachment is necessary in order to admit this evidence. Some jurisdictions
require that impeachment have been by prior inconsistent behavior, 12 others require it to have been by general bad character,13
and still others require it merely to have been by cross-examination
of the witness.14 The final theory of admissibility permits the introduction of evidence of fresh complaint to deter the jury from
inferring consent to the offense by the victim when the evidence
does not otherwise indicate that a fresh complaint was made. 15 This
theory follows the seemingly irregular procedure of admitting evidence to negate other evidence that has not been formally introduced on the assumption that the natural tendency of the jury is
to infer that a noncomplaining prosecutrix consented to the crime. 16
For example, fresh complaint would be admissible in a rape case
under this theory to refute the inference, permissible under a record
silent as to the victim's complaint,17 that the victim consented to
the offense.
The question of the admissibility of evidence of fresh complaint
in prosecutions for sexual offenses other than rape has produced
much discord among the writers and the courts. 18 An analysis of
8. See, e.g., Luke v. State, 184 Ga. 551, 192 S.E. 37 (1937); Brooks v. Commonwealth,
235 Ky. 19, 29 S.W.2d 597 (1930); Terrill v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 584, 112 S.W.2d 734
(1937); State v. Linton, 36 Wash. 2d 67, 216 P.2d 761 (1950).
9. See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 49 (1954).
10. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1140.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 67 N.E.2d 234 (1946); State v.
Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 188 S.W.2d 12 (1945); State v. Saccone, 7 N.J. Super. 263, 72
A.2d 923 (1950); State v. Werner, 16 N.D. 83, 112 N.W. 60 (1907).
12. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39 (1871).
13. See, e.g., Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624 (1855).
14. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 125 N.C. 606, 34 S.E. 105 (1899).
15. See, e.g., People v. Luce, 210 Mich. 621, 178 N.W. 54 (1920); Baccio v. People,
41 N.Y. 265 (1869); Harmon v. Territory, 5 Okla. 368, 49 Pac. 55 (1897); Rogers v.
State, 124 Tex. Crim. 430, 63 S.W.2d 384 (1933); State v. Willett, 78 Vt. 157, 62 Atl. 48
(1905); State v. Mau, 41 Wyo. 365, 285 Pac. 992 (1930).
16. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1135.
17. Professor McCormick has characterized this theory as a modern sophistication
designed to reconcile the ancient admissibility of evidence of fresh complaint with the
modern ban upon hearsay. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 9, § 49. See generally
Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. l (1937).
18. Compare People v. Romano, 306 Ill. 502, 138 N.E. 169 (1923) and Purifoy v.
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the theories supporting admission of evidence· of fresh complaint
indicates the nature of the offense is irrelevant under either the
res gestae or corroboration of complaining witness theories because
these theories rely on generally applicable rules of evidence. 19 However, under the third theory, which allows evidence of fresh complaint to refute an inference of consent, such evidence should be
admissible only in proceedings involving sexual offenses to which
consent is a defense.20 Evidence of fresh complaint, therefore, would
be immaterial and should not be permitted under this theory in
sodomy cases because consent is not a defense to the crime of
sodomy.21 Furthermore, justifying admission of fresh complaint
under this theory on the ground that it will support the unimpeached victim's general credibility violates the rule prohibiting
support of credibility until it has been disputed.22
Even though evidence of fresh complaint is determined to be
admissible, as in the principal case, it does not follow that evidence
of the failure to complain is also properly admissible.28 For example,
if the evidence of a fresh complaint were admitted under the res
gestae exception to the hearsay rule, the failure to complain would
clearly not be admissible as a res gestae declaration. 24 In addition,
the failure to complain should not be admissible to impeach the
victim of a crime to which consent is not a defense. If the alleged
victim of a sexual crime were asked whether he consented to the
crime and, upon his denial, if he were confronted with his failure
to make an immediate complaint, the witness would have been
improperly impeached on a collateral fact25 in a proceeding in which
consent plays no part.
The principal case seems to have analyzed the issue in terms of
State, 163 Tex. Crim. 488, 293 s.w.2d 663 (1956) and l WHAllTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 437 (11th ed. 1935) and 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 11!15, with Coplin v.
People, 67 Colo. 17, 185 Pac. 254 (1919) and State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 69 Atl.
1054 (1908) and 3 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 602 (5th ed. 1957).
19. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 49, Zl4.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Mantooth, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 19 C.M.R. 377 (1955);
Purifoy v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 488, 293 S.W.2d 663 (1956); Pepoon v. Commonwealth,
192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951).
21. See generally James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L REv.
689 (1941); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VANO. L.
REv. 385 (1952).
22. See, e.g., Mellon v. United States, 170 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1948); State v. Harmon,
278 S.W. 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925); Newton v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 400, 180 S.W.2d
946 (1944).
23. But see principal case at 667.
24. In fact, consideration of the res gestae exception is largely academic, inasmuch
as the failure to complain, not being a statement, may fall outside normal hearsay
categories. The question of admissibility, then, would tum upon relevancy and
materiality.
25. See, e.g., Consolidated Beef &: Provision Co. v. Witt &: Co., 184 Md. 105, 40 A.2d
295 (1944); Klein v. Keresey, 307 Mass. 51, 29 N.E.2d 703 (1940).
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the expected reaction of a victim of the crime of sodomy, concluding
that the victim's failure to complain was admissible to contradict
his testimony. In reaching this result, the court analogized the expected reaction of a victim of sodomy to that of a victim of rape,
stating that a nonconsenting male victim of the crime of sodomy
would certainly be expected to make a fresh complaint.26 There is
merit in the court's analysis of admissibility in terms of an attack
on the general credibility of the prosecution witness through
actions on his part arguably inconsistent with his testimony as to
the occurrence of the alleged criminal act.27 Nonetheless, the relevance of the absence of fresh complaint as used by the defense to
impeach the complaining witness is uncertain. Therefore, while the
court wisely decided to uphold the law officer's admission of the
evidence showing lack of fresh complaint, it may have erred in overturning the officer's determination not to give an instruction which
would have isolated the effect of that evidence for the court-martial
panel's consideration.28 Even in the paternalistic setting of a courtmartial,20 the solution of a problem so intimately connected with
a close question of relevancy should be left, in the absence of a
clear-cut abuse of discretion, to the person conducting the trial.

26. Principal case at 667.
27. See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1135, at 219.
28. Moreover, if the evidence of the victim's failure to make fresh complaint
properly went only to his general credibility, the law officer giving the requested
instruction would probably have had to specify this point. Perhaps, without such an
instruction, some members of the court-martial panel may have assumed that the
evidence of the failure to complain could properly go to the occurrence of the alleged
criminal act itself, a circumstance favoring defendant.
29. See 65 MICH. L. REv. 168 (1964)-

